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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzed the dynamic framing processes that occurred within the public 
discourse in the United States surrounding the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a US citizen, 
by a CIA drone in Yemen on September 30, 2011.  The study examined mainstream media 
broadcast transcripts and publications, advocacy organization press releases, and government 
statements to analyze the framing of the drone program in the aftermath of the incident as 
compared to an earlier strike on a non-US citizen, Baitullah Mehsud.  The study found that the 
killing of al-Awlaki generated a “legality” frame that differs qualitatively from prior discourse 
that focused on strategic implications of the program.  Whereas prior drone strikes produced 
debate over the strategic utility of drones, the killing of al-Awlaki caused a shift in focus to the 
legality of drones within the post-9/11 political context.  These findings suggest that the killing 
of a US citizen by the US government created a breach in which previously parallel ideological 
goals of execution of the war on terror and protection of civil liberties came into contradiction 
with one another.  The introduction of a new frame suggests a shift in the narrative pertaining to 
the relationship between liberty and security in the context of the war on terror, while also 
raising questions about contemporary citizenship in a globalizing world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the differential framing processes that occurred 
within the public discourse in the United States surrounding the targeted killing of Anwar al-
Awlaki, a US citizen, by an unmanned aerial vehicle (“UAV” or “drone”) in Yemen on 
September 30, 2011.  This paper will articulate the impact of this incident on the changing 
perception of drone use and targeted killing by comparatively analyzing the framing of the al-
Awlaki killing and the framing of another high profile drone strike—that which caused the death 
of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud—in August 2009.  This paper will then suggest 
particular ideological ramifications of this change on the continuing discursive construction of 
the post-9/11 US political context. 
At the time of his death, Al-Awlaki, an American-educated native of New Mexico and 
high ranking member of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had become a high-value 
terrorist target of the United States for his role in utilizing digital technology to radicalize 
potential terrorists in English-speaking countries as well as his material roles in various terror 
plots such as the Fort Hood shooting on November 5, 2009 and the attempted “underwear 
bombing” incident on a commercial airliner heading to Detroit, Michigan on December 25, 2009.  
Al-Awlaki was killed, along with fellow American citizen Samir Khan, when a hellfire missile, 
fired from a CIA Reaper drone, struck his convoy in a joint military operation in Yemen on 
September 30, 2011 (Mazzetti 2013).  The successful drone strike was at the least the second 
attempt to eliminate al-Awlaki using drone technology.  Similarly, Mehsud was killed by a US 
drone strike on August 5, 2009, in Pakistan.  Mehsud was the leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban), and was considered responsible for a campaign of suicide 
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bombings designed to drive Pakistani and US forces out of tribal areas and to impose Sharia law 
in the areas (Mazzetti 2013:157). 
This paper will argue that while both incidents garnered attention in the mainstream 
media, the al-Awlaki incident precipitated the introduction of a “legality” frame that represents a 
qualitatively new strand of discourse in the public sphere debate over the use of drones by the 
US government.  This argument is achieved and supported by an analytical comparison of the 
discourse following the al-Awlaki drone strike to the parallel discourse following the Mehsud 
killing.  Framing analysis provides a unique set of tools that can be used to determine the cultural 
and ideological values associated with a public response to an event (Snow and Benford 2000); 
the methodology has not, to this point, been applied to the discourse surrounding the drone 
program or the killing of al-Awlaki in this way.  It will be argued that this particular incident—
the ordered killing of a US citizen by the US government and the subsequent generation of a 
“legality” frame in the public discourse—suggests an attempt by activists and political actors to 
harness citizens’ ideological beliefs about American civil liberties in the post-9/11 context to 
construct a contentious discourse on the use of drones for targeted killing. 
The analytical significance of measuring the discursive shift following the al-Awlaki 
killing is three-fold.  First, on a most basic level, the application of a dependable analytical 
method—framing analysis—to drone discourse will provide a material contribution to a growing 
understanding of the role of drones as both strategic tools in the war on terror and as symbolic 
objects in the persistent negotiation between liberty and security in the post-9/11 political 
context.  Second, the intentional killing of a citizen by that citizen’s government as part of a war 
whose sides are only defined ambiguously raises questions about contemporary citizenship in a 
globalizing world.  Finally, the notion of framing as remedial ideological work (Snow and 
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Benford 2000) suggests that the introduction of a new strand of discourse—that is, a “legality” 
frame—represents an attempt by political actors to influence widely held beliefs and values 
pertaining to the relationship between liberty and security in the context of the war on terror. 
LITERATURE 
Framing Literature 
Framing has emerged as a crucial element of social movement literature in recent 
scholarship focused on understanding the mechanisms behind consensus building and the 
mobilization of collective action.  Framing analysis represents a methodological opportunity to 
evaluate the cultural and ideological attitudes upon which collective action can be built as well as 
the dominant value structures that guide citizens’ policy preferences (Zald 1996; Benford and 
Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 2000; Nelson and Willey 2001).  The study of political 
contention requires an analysis of framing, for what is determined through framing is the nature 
of political reality itself (Benford 1993).  Snow et al. (1986) argue that framing analysis is 
significant because it accounts for the interpretive tasks associated with collective action that 
other approaches tend to exclude.   
Framing and contentious politics  
The study of social movements has dominated the literature on collective action, but Tilly 
and Tarrow (2007) have attempted to disentangle the study of collective action from social 
movements, arguing instead that categorizing all forms of collective action only as they relate to 
a narrowly defined social movement category restricts the opportunity to properly understand 
collective action that does not meet the criteria to be categorized as a social movement.  Rather, 
Tilly and Tarrow advocate for the concept of “contentious politics” to account for a range of 
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actions that involve groups or individuals making contentious claims on political actors.  
Contentious politics is inclusive of, but not limited to, social movements (Tilly and Tarrow 
2007).      
 This paper will examine the use of framing strategies—traditionally understood within 
the social movement context—within the broader context of contentious politics by examining a 
particular case study.  The death of Anwar al-Awlaki by a CIA drone represents a significant 
point within a contentious discourse that is not necessarily tied to a dedicated social movement 
but which exhibits the framing processes and dynamics discussed by Benford and Snow (2000) 
and Gamson (1992).  Official statements by government officials as well as those of activists and 
advocacy organizations from the days immediately following the event reflect at least two out of 
three core framing tasks presented by Benford and Snow (2000).   
Framing and ideology 
The relationship between framing and ideology is one that has become a point of debate 
among framing scholars (Zald 1996; Snow and Benford 2000; Nelson and Willey 2001; Oliver 
and Johnston 2005).  Snow and Benford argue that framing draws on ideology and can be used to 
negotiate ideological contradictions.  Ideology provides a toolbox from which political actors can 
generate frames that have high degrees of resonance in the general population.  In this particular 
case, those actors who initiated the “legality” frame utilized Snow et al.’s (1986) frame 
amplification to draw upon the American ideology of civil liberties to create frame resonance for 
their opposition to the targeted killing program.   
For individuals, frames can provide a tool for situating empirical observations in the 
context of ideological belief when the two are not congruent.  Framing allows groups to engage 
in this “remedial ideological work” by providing a lens through which citizens can explain real 
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world events that do not match ideological symbols or beliefs (Snow and Benford 2000).  The 
killing of a US citizen by the CIA produced this type of breach, as the previously congruent 
ideological beliefs about execution of the war on terror and protection of American civil liberties 
were brought into contradiction with one another.  Zald (1996) concurs that major historical 
events can illuminate cultural contradictions that necessitate reality construction, which is where 
framing finds its relevance in this scenario.  It is clear that political actors and activists attempted 
to utilize Snow and Benford’s (2000) concept of remedial ideological work in an attempt to 
situate the intentional killing of a US citizen by the US government in the larger context of 
American post-9/11 ideology. 
Nelson and Willey (2001) argue that it is value structures—not ideologies—that 
influence peoples’ opinions on political issues.  Because nearly every issue involves conflicting 
values, Nelson and Willey argue that issue framing is an essential process by which contentious 
political actors can amplify particular values over others in order to mobilize support for their 
cause.  Nelson and Willey argue a similar perspective as Snow and Benford, but argue that 
instead of having unified, abstract ideologies that guide a universal set of political beliefs, 
individuals turn to individual values to guide their political preferences on an issue by issue 
basis.  To Nelson and Willey, then, it is the job of those generating and articulating frames to 
amplify particular values over others; in this scenario, Nelson and Willey would argue that it is 
the job of framing actors to help guide citizens through the debate between liberty and security in 
order to help them determine their preference on the use of drones in the war on terror. 
Related Drone Literature   
 Drones represent a new vehicle for studying the war on terror and the post-9/11 United 
States political context.  While research on drones is a relatively new field, scholars are 
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beginning to carve out various research trajectories on the topic.  Research on the effectiveness 
of the drone program itself represents one such strand.  Carvin (2012) argues that while the 
public debates the strategic efficacy of drone warfare, new assessment techniques are necessary 
to determine the realistic advantages and disadvantages of this new military technique.  
Kaltenthaler, Fair, and Miller (2013) argue that Pakistani citizens are largely opposed to drone 
warfare, and that the degree of opposition is directly correlated to level of education on the topic 
of drones.  Similarly, Hudson, Owens, and Flannes (2011) and Boyle (2013) argue that while 
some drone attacks likely achieve their intended purpose, the strategic benefit of these attacks is 
outweighed by the high numbers of civilian casualties and the resulting political strain between 
the US and the affected states and citizens.  Conversely, Llenza (2011) argues that predator 
strikes in Pakistan are both legal and effective counterterrorism measures.  Williams (2010) 
argues that assessing strategic advantages and disadvantages to US military operations ignores an 
important third variable—that drone strikes find support with Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen who 
oppose the Taliban.   
 An additional strand of drone research examines the ethics of a targeted killing program 
such as that of the United States in the war on terror.  Aslam (2011) argues that a policy of 
targeted killing as a counterterrorism strategy cannot be considered a responsible program for a 
global superpower.  While Aslam puts forth a new framework for making this argument, 
multiple scholars argue that drones have ethical implications when utilizing international law as 
an ethical framework (Ratner 2007; Enemark 2011).  
 A particularly salient segment of the drone literature to this paper is the minimal existing 
research on media coverage of drone warfare.  Jones, Sheets, and Rowling (2011) and Zia (2013) 
conduct comparative frame analyses looking at differences between media presentation of drone 
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warfare in domestic and foreign news sources.  Jones, Sheets, and Rowling find that domestic 
news sources are more likely to build narratives about drones that support United States national 
identity and justify drone use, while British and Pakistani newspapers are more likely to focus on 
negative impacts such as civilian casualties.  Zia finds that cultural proximity is an important 
factor—that is, the framing of drone strikes becomes more negative as one moves geographically 
closer to the most affected areas. 
Legal-academic discussion 
 Despite its relative absence from the public sphere prior to 2011, the legality of drone 
strikes has been a distinct topic of discussion within the legal-academic community since well 
before the al-Awlaki killing, but has increased in volume and scope since the incident.  This 
literature represents a healthy debate over the legality or lack thereof of drone warfare (Downes 
2004; Jahagirdar 2008; Ramsden 2011; Farley 2012).  While it does focus on legality as a central 
issue, this literature is restricted to the purpose of determining the legality of drone warfare itself; 
this paper, on the other hand, is concerned not with the outcome of this legal debate but rather 
the origination and social implications of the debate itself within the public sphere.  Therefore, 
while the current academic discussion about the legality of drones within the legal field is 
tangentially related to the goals of this paper, the answers to the research questions posed here 
cannot be found within this thread.   
At the same time, this legal debate represents the type of discursive content that this 
paper argues doesn’t emerge in the public sphere until after the al-Awlaki killing.  This is 
because the debate within the legal community is not being utilized within the framework of 
contentious politics nor is it occurring with the intent of mobilizing collective action.  It does 
appear, however, that this previously existing academic discourse on the legality of drones 
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provided the foundational arguments for what would become the legality frame that emerged in 
following the killing of al-Awlaki. 
Post-9/11 Ideology 
The post-9/11 era is marked in significant ways by the war on terror as its own ideology 
(Chandhoke 2007).  The al-Awlaki killing and the related discourse occur within the post-9/11 
political context, and this is a crucial element of the relationship between the framing of the issue 
and dominant ideologies and value structures.  Since 9/11, the narrative of counterterrorism has 
dominated the news media landscape (Altheide 2009).  This war on terror ideology served as the 
political backdrop for the introduction of the “legality” frame.  
Prior to the generation of this frame, however, the dominant rhetoric centered on winning 
the war on terror at all costs; this logic resulted in detention and interrogation programs at 
Guantanamo Bay, the USA Patriot Act, and other controversial practices by the US government.  
Hutcheson et al. (2004) argue that during the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration engaged 
in particular discursive tactics designed to increase support for these controversial war on terror 
policies.  That is, in order to garner support for policies like the USA Patriot Act and military 
pursuits such as the Iraq War, the administration constructed a reality in which security had to be 
protected at the expense of civil liberties.   As a result, opposition to these controversial policies, 
while present and at times vigorous, ultimately faded into the ideology that securing the United 
States against terrorism was an end that justified the means necessary for its achievement. 
While these policies and actions all had detractors, the conversation tended to return to its 
focus on the strategic objective of stopping terror.  The al-Awlaki case is another instance within 
this trend of legally ambiguous action by the state; unlike the other situations mentioned, 
however, the legal objection to this particular state action became a major frame through which 
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the policy was discussed.  This outcome appears to be the result of the unprecedented action of 
targeting a US citizen and the subsequent framing processes that political actors used to attempt 
to mobilize public opinion. 
Citizenship within post-9/11 ideology 
The security-based political context, in combination with ambiguous definitions of the 
“enemy,” brought forth questions about US citizenship in the post-9/11 era.   That is, with an 
ambiguously defined enemy, the question of what citizenship entails within the post-9/11 
political context began to arise.  By declaring war on a “stateless” and ambiguously defined 
enemy, the United States altered notions about the particular qualities of individuals and groups 
that could be defined as in alignment with the “enemy.” Grewal (2003) describes the 
racialization of the “enemy” in the post-9/11 era, arguing that the Otherization of Muslim and 
Arab Americans was a major part of the “us versus them” binary that characterized much of the 
political rhetoric of the administration after 9/11.  Schildkraut (2002; 2009) and Salaita (2005) 
argue that this racialization led to structural violence that increased the risk of differential 
protection under the law for certain groups of US citizens. 
 The war on terror legitimized intolerant modes of conceptualizing citizenship—a pattern 
indicative of a developing value structure that favored security over civil liberties, particularly in 
regard to certain segments of the population (Chandhoke 2007).  In a society dominated by an 
ideology of defeating an enemy—in particular, an ambiguous enemy whose geographic reach 
expands across the globe—it is logical that discourse on policies related to the war on terror 
would revolve around the strategic benefit of those policies.   
 Even as the line between citizen and enemy status became blurred, the narrative of 
executing the war on terror for the protection of real Americans’ civil liberties remained strong 
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(Altheide 2009).  That is, while winning the war on terror dominated the national narrative in the 
post-9/11 era, the importance of American liberties remained ideologically parallel.  Political 
actors hoping to generate resonant frames have to align their frames with the dominant 
ideological trend of the war on terror, which is where the “legality” frame becomes a unique 
concept because it implies that due process is necessary even for certain individuals who identify 
with and have been clearly established to be aligned with the “enemy” as it is understood within 
the post-9/11 context (Snow et al. 1986).   
The narrative behind controversial policies such as the Patriot Act and interrogation and 
detention was that these policies were designed to protect the freedoms that made the US 
exceptional; this narrative, however, was inconsistent in its application to all segments of US 
citizenry.  The killing of al-Awlaki caused a significant contradiction because, while the 
narrative remained the same, the intentional killing of a US citizen without due process 
materially breached the idea that all US citizens had protections under US law. 
Post-9/11 ideology and the public sphere 
The war on terror generated profound changes in the global community within both 
material and symbolic channels, significantly altering the context of the public sphere.  As a 
result, the war on terror began to serve as a backdrop against which any policy decisions—be 
they military, foreign, security, or any other—had to be made.  This same backdrop existed for 
individuals or groups wishing to voice resistance to these policies. 
In addition to the effects on material policy, the war on terror ideology had symbolic 
impacts.  The ambiguity of the “enemy” caused a situation in which enemy status was not always 
clearly defined.  The administration’s framing of the post-9/11 context was bounded up with 
strong implications of the importance of an American national identity (Hutcheson et al. 2004; 
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Maggio 2007).  This campaign caused a narrowing of the American “ideal-type” as national 
identity became conflated with security.  That is, the narrowing of American identity 
simultaneously led to an expansion of potential enemies— a group that included segments of the 
American population that didn’t meet the criteria of the racialized or patriotic American ideal.  
Post-9/11 ideology and the media 
An increasingly important element within the modern repertoire for collective action is 
the media.  The media represents the greatest opportunity for frame diffusion by actors making 
claims on the state (Zald 1996; Gamson and Meyer 1996).  The media has become a major tool 
within contentious politics, providing a vehicle for the diffusion of claims to an expanding 
audience at an increasingly fast pace (Tarrow 2011).  Indeed, Walgrave and Manssens (2005) 
argue that the mass media can be useful in mobilizing not only public opinion but collective 
action itself.  Within the modern repertoire of contention, it is imperative for political actors to 
operate within the media (Tarrow 2011). 
Reese (2010) analyzes the way that the administration framed the post-9/11 political 
landscape, and argues that the media played a significant role in furthering the War on Terror 
frame that the administration used to justify military action as the only solution to terrorism.  
Reese argues that the War on Terror frame served as an organizing structure for American 
ideology in the post-9/11 environment, making it difficult for opponents of the war on terror and 
its associated policies to articulate their opposition.  In this scenario, the media’s effort to appear 
unbiased led to a naturalization of the war on terror that caused it to be perceived not as a policy, 
but as a reified way of life. 
There have been few studies analyzing the coverage of drones in the media.  Jones, 
Sheets, and Rowling (2011) argue that American journalists frame drones in a way that protects 
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US national identity, while foreign newspapers are more likely to discuss the negative outcomes 
of drone use, such as civilian casualties.  Zia (2013) argues that cultural proximity plays a role in 
coverage of the drone program, finding more substantial coverage of drone strikes in Pakistani 
newspapers than in British or American newspapers.  These studies focus on external 
comparison; that is, they compare news sources in the United States to news sources outside of 
the United States.  There has not been, to this point, a framing analysis of the shift in discourse 
within the United States as a result of the al-Awlaki killing. 
METHODS  
Data Collection 
This paper utilizes public discourse as data, in the form of news transcripts and 
publications, press releases from advocacy organizations, and statements from government 
officials involved in the execution of drone operations.  These particular sources were chosen 
because they represent the segment of the public sphere in which drone discourse occurs.  The 
universe of discourse on drones is comprised of these actors.   
 The particular media sources being analyzed are news transcripts and publications from 
CNN, Fox News Network, and MSNBC.  These media outlets were selected for their mainstream 
prominence and combined coverage of a large portion of the political spectrum in the United 
States.  The sample was limited to US media outlets.  These sources were analyzed for the time 
period of September 30 through October 7, 2011 (the immediate aftermath of the al-Awlaki 
killing) and for August 5 through August 12, 2009 (the immediate aftermath of the Mehsud 
killing).  The al-Awlaki killing produced fifty-seven transcripts and fifteen articles between these 
media outlets, while the Mehsud killing produced twenty and eight, respectively. 
	   13 
It is important to note that the transcripts consist primarily of interviews and panels with 
experts and activists.  Therefore, the goal of this paper is not to claim intentionality on the part of 
the particular media outlets in constructing the legality frame, but rather to analyze the way that 
political actors diffuse their framing practices through these media outlets.   
 The data from advocacy organizations will include press releases from the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Amnesty International (AI).  The total number of press 
releases analyzed was seventeen. 
 Statements from government officials were included in the analysis.  This included 
executive branch personnel, military personnel, and CIA personnel.  These comments appear in 
the media transcripts, as well as in a small number of isolated statements and released 
documents. 
The news media transcripts and publications were collected using online databases, while 
the press releases were collected directly through organizational websites.  The government 
statements were embedded within the broadcast transcripts as well as in standalone documents 
such as the Department of Justice white paper that was released to clarify the legal justification 
for conducting targeted killings against US citizens.  The total number of documents analyzed 
was 117. 
Data analysis 
 Once collected, data were organized by date and coded by frame (e.g. legality, strategy, 
morality).  The coding system utilized semantic analysis to identify the presence of the various 
frames within the data (see “operational definitions of frames”).  The data were then further 
analyzed in order to find which specific frame components were present (e.g., within the strategy 
	   14 
frame, “fosters terrorist recruitment” or “eliminates terrorist leader”; within the legality frame, 
“no due process” or “enemy combatant status”).  The frequency of the presence of various 
frames were compared between the two timeframes and recorded (see Tables 1, 2, 3).   
Arguments in support and arguments against the drone strikes and killings are both 
included in the analysis, if they are invoking a particular frame.  For example, arguments that the 
drone strike was legal because al-Awlaki had declared war on the United States and had engaged 
in material support for Al Qaeda terrorist plots are considered within the “legality” frame, while 
arguments that the drone strike was a good thing because it resulted in the elimination of a high-
value terror target and a strategic victory for the United States is not invoking the “legality” 
frame.  Rather, this second example would be occurring within the “strategy” frame, which 
represents the dominant frame in the drone discourse prior to the al-Awlaki killing.  This 
differentiation is the crux of the argument of this paper; that is, the al-Awlaki killing resulted in a 
shift from a discourse on drones focusing on strategic victories and defeats in the war on terror to 
a discourse on whether or not using drones to fight the war on terror was legal in the first place—
the latter of which has since become a dominant frame within the discourse.  
It is important to stress that the argument presented in this paper is based upon a temporal 
change in total discourse rather than spatial differentiation between political actors within a 
single time period.  That is, Fox, CNN, MSNBC, ACLU and other organizations are all viewed 
as participating in a single discourse that unfolds in total.  The unit of analysis, therefore, is the 
time period within which the discourse occurs rather than any particular actor or set of actors.  
Based upon an analysis over time, it is clear that the al-Awlaki killing facilitated the expansion 
of the discourse to incorporate a distinct “legality” frame. 
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Operational definitions of frames 
 The data produced three clear thematic trends that were used to construct three particular 
frames.  These frames are “legality,” “morality,” and “strategy.”  Each was operationalized 
according to their primary components.  Each frame displayed diagnostic and prognostic 
elements, consistent with those described by Benford and Snow (2000).  In order to operate 
within a particular frame, the speaker did not need to oppose the drone program.  
 The strategy frame is constituted by rhetoric that invokes or makes an argument toward 
whether or not the drone program or the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki or Baitullah 
Mehsud was strategically beneficial toward the United States’ goal of winning the war on terror.  
There are three diagnostic components of this frame: “anti-Americanism” (program/killing cause 
anti-Americanism and/or foster terrorist radicalization), “uncoordinated” (dealing with lack of 
coordination of drone program between Pentagon and CIA) and “ineffective/mistake-prone” 
(that the program is not helpful or is less effective than alternatives).  A major theme within the 
media transcripts was warnings of retaliatory attacks following the al-Awlaki killing; this was 
coded as “anti-Americanism.” 
The sole prognostic component of the strategy frame was “coordination is good,” which 
is essentially operationalized by claims that the program would be more effective if the Pentagon 
and CIA could come up with consistent parameters for the execution of the program, or if the 
program would just be moved out of the CIA and into the Pentagon altogether.   
 The “legality” frame is constituted by rhetoric that invokes or makes an argument about 
whether or not the United States drone program or the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki or 
Baitullah Mehsud was legal.  The diagnostic components of this frame are particular arguments 
that are meant to illustrate how or why the program is legal or illegal.  There are seven unique 
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diagnostic elements of the legality frame that appear in the discourse.  The seven diagnostic 
components of the legality frame are “due process,” “outside of declared battlefield,” “judicial 
efficacy” (arguments about the efficacy of a justice system that permits targeted killings), 
“executive overreach,” “international law” (whether it violates or not),  “imminent threat,” and 
“slippery slope.”  
 There are four prognostic components of the legality frame.  The prognostic components 
are constituted by distinct arguments for how to remedy the legal problems with the drone 
program that were laid out as diagnostic components of the frame.  These prognostic components 
are “judicial integrity” (arguments about whether judges should force the government to be 
transparent about the drone program), “transparency” (that the government should release its 
criteria for why al-Awlaki and others can be targeted), “coordination” (better CIA/DOJ 
coordination could bring program within legal bounds), and “international law” (that the drone 
program should be conducted in accordance with international law).  Interestingly, there is no 
prognostic claim that the government should end the drone program altogether. 
 The morality frame is constituted by rhetoric that calls into question the morality or ethics 
of the US drone program.  Because of the ambiguity of the concept of morality, this frame is the 
most difficult to operationalize, though it appears to be a distinct strand within the discourse 
nonetheless.  The diagnostic component of the morality frame is that drone warfare results in 
large numbers of civilian casualties.  This is the most common argument against the drone 
program on moral grounds.  The morality frame does have three distinct prognostic elements.  
The first is that increased coordination of the drone program—particularly better communication 
between the Pentagon and the CIA—could prevent large numbers of civilian casualties.  The 
second prognostic component is the argument that the drone program should have greater 
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accountability.  Finally, the third prognostic component of the morality frame is that families of 
civilian casualties should be compensated for their losses.  
FINDINGS 
 The comparative model utilized in this study to analyze the temporal differences in the 
discourse on targeted killings revealed numerous stark contrasts in the framing of the drone issue 
between the aftermath of the Mehsud killing and that of the al-Awlaki killing.  The argument that 
the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki produced a qualitatively new strand of discourse in the drone 
debate—a “legality” frame—is strongly supported in the data.  The discourse on drones expands 
following the incident in terms of both complexity and volume of participation.  The public 
sphere’s response to the killing of Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009 portrays a relatively 
unilinear conversation focused on a simple assessment of the role of drones in the context of the 
war on terror with intermittent mentions of civilian casualties.  The killing of al-Awlaki, on the 
other hand, produced a complex and self-reflexive dialogue that incorporated strategic concerns 
but also focused on negotiating the role of citizenship within the post-9/11 political climate in the 
United States.   
 Across all segments of the data, the common theme was a sharp increase in both volume 
and complexity within the discussion of targeted killings upon al-Awlaki’s death in comparison 
to the discussion following the death of Mehsud.  The number of broadcast transcripts 
mentioning drones and targeted killings in the aftermath of the al-Awlaki killing was nearly 
triple that of the same criteria following the Mehsud killing.  Because of the differing roles of the 
media and advocacy organizations within the public sphere, there were functional differences 
between the rhetoric within these two data segments.  That is, as a provider of information, the 
framing within the media took a primarily diagnostic tone by discussing the drone program in its 
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current state, while the advocacy organizations placed a heavier emphasis on prognostic framing 
by focusing on recommendations for responsible use of drones in the future.    
Media 
Table 1 illustrates the variation in the discourse both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
indicating the number of media broadcast transcripts that addressed the two killings as well as 
the frequency of particular frames being utilized in the discourse over the course of the given 
time period.  Table 1 represents the aggregate media broadcast discourse. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of Frames in CNN, MSNBC, and Fox Broadcast Transcripts  
August 5 – 12, 2009 and September 30 – October 7, 2011 
Frame Mehsud, 2009 (n=20) Al-Awlaki, 2011 (n=57) 
Strategy 15 (75%) 42 (73.68%) 
Morality 1 (5%) 4 (7.02%) 
Legality 0 (0%) 39 (68.42%) 
 
 
As is indicated in Table 1, the Mehsud killing did not elicit discussion of the legality of 
drones or the targeted killing program from any of these major news networks.  The discussion 
of the death of al-Awlaki on Fox, CNN, and MSNBC began similarly—with discussion of the 
strategic victory brought about by the successful elimination of a target using a drone strike.  
Despite similar initial concerns, the conversation in this second instance quickly became 
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multifaceted, focusing almost equally—in terms of the percentages of transcripts that evoked the 
various themes—on this strategic angle as well as the newly introduced legal angle.  CNN 
addressed the drone strike most frequently by discussing the incident 37 times during the second 
time period.  Fox News addressed the incident twelve times, and MSNBC discussed it a mere 
four times.  Fox News and MSNBC immediately acknowledged the killing as the result of a US 
drone strike, while CNN mentions al-Awlaki’s death a number of times before treating it as a 
confirmed United States drone strike. 
The simplest trend in the discourse when comparing the al-Awlaki killing and the 
Mehsud killing is the clear difference in the degree of complexity.  That is, after al-Awlaki’s 
killing, the news media features rhetoric coming from morality, legality, and strategy frames, 
each with diagnostic and prognostic components.  Each frame is represented through multiple 
diagnostic components and at least one prognostic component within the discourse from 2011.  
The discourse following Mehsud’s killing, on the other hand, is almost entirely strategic, with 
exclusively diagnostic components of the strategy frame appearing in the week after the drone 
strike.  Following al-Awlaki’s killing, out of 57 transcripts featuring discussion of the strike, 39 
featured the legality frame, four featured the morality frame, and 42 featured the strategy frame.  
Clearly, the al-Awlaki killing produced a complex and nuanced dialogue.  Conversely, out of the 
twenty transcripts featuring discussion of the Mehsud killing, fifteen utilized the strategy frame, 
while zero utilized the legality frame.  The proportional frequency of the morality frame was 
roughly similar between the two time periods. 
 As expected, the print media from these same news sources displayed similar patterns as 
the broadcast transcripts.  The majority of the articles take a highly informative tone—as 
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opposed to the discussion-based format utilized in the broadcasts—but the framing patterns are 
consistent nonetheless.  Table 2 illustrates these patterns.   
 
Table 2: Frequency of Frames in CNN, MSNBC, and Fox Published Articles  
August 5 – 12, 2009 and September 30 – October 7, 2011 
Frame Mehsud, 2009 (n=8) Al-Awlaki, 2011 (n=15) 
Strategy 3 (37.50%) 10 (66.67%) 
Morality 0  (0.00%) 3 (20.00%) 
Legality 0 (0.00%) 6 (40.00%) 
  
 
 The framing patterns present in the published articles are somewhat muted in comparison 
to those that occur in the broadcast transcripts, though they continue to support the argument that 
the killing of al-Awlaki precipitated the generation of the legality frame.  The articles were 
primarily informational and in large part did not address questions of the efficacy of drones in a 
legal, strategic, or moral discourse.  Many of the articles following the Mehsud killing, in 
particular, address drones only briefly, and at times tangentially in the context of a discussion 
about other national security concerns.  The articles from 2009, all of which came from CNN, 
fail to confirm Mehsud’s death, though they acknowledge near assurance that it had occurred.  In 
these eight articles from 2009, the only frame utilized is the strategy frame, and the only 
component represented is a counter to the argument that drones or targeted killings are 
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ineffective; more specifically, it is noted multiple times that the death of Mehsud via a United 
States drone strike is a victory for the US in the war on terror. 
 The conversation following the al-Awlaki killing mirrored the pattern present in the 
broadcast transcripts.  That is, the first several articles invoked only the strategy frame, but as the 
conversation developed, it became more nuanced and multifaceted.  The strategy frame remained 
the most frequently utilized frame, but the introduction of the legality frame remains consistent 
with the broadcast data. 
  While the framing of the killings in the publications was not as pronounced as it was in 
the broadcast transcripts, the act of descriptively justifying the drone strikes was prevalent across 
all media data.  That is, without framing it as a legal or strategic issue, seventy-five percent of all 
media data made reference to the roles the targeted killing victim had been alleged to have 
played in terrorist plots against the United States.   
Advocacy Organizations 
 Though the media may arguably have greater influence in the public sphere, advocacy 
organizations may have been the public site of the introduction of the legality frame.  The pattern 
of discourse in advocacy organizations differs from that in the media, though it supports the 
same conclusion.  Because of the relative dearth of press releases, this study examined all drone-
related press releases from the selected advocacy organizations and discovered that other than 
one press release by Amnesty International in 2006, these particular advocacy organizations did 
not enter the public sphere discussion of United States drones until 2010.  While al-Awlaki had 
not yet been killed at this point, this is significant because the entry of advocacy organizations 
into the discourse (other than the lone 2006 outlier from AI) occurred after it was made public 
that the US government had authorized a strike on al-Awlaki (Shane 2010).  Even so, excluding 
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the AI 2006 press release, the legality frame does not surface in press releases until after al-
Awlaki’s death. 
 The ACLU played a key role in generating the legality frame by responding to Shane’s 
2010 report with direct legal action against the US government.  The ACLU filed a lawsuit on al-
Awlaki’s behalf in August 2010 (al-Aulaqi v. Obama).  A federal court dismissed the lawsuit in 
December 2010, but the ACLU has filed several additional legal claims on behalf of al-Awlaki 
and others, as well as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests seeking the release of the 
classified documents that contained criteria for the targeted killing of US citizens.  The 
Department of Justice released a white paper containing this information in February 2013, 
though advocacy groups viewed this gesture as failing to be fully transparent, as is indicated in 
more recent press releases. 
 Table 3 illustrates the frequency of the three frames in the press releases from the ACLU 
and Amnesty International.  Out of the seventeen total press releases, all invoke the legality 
frame (fifteen of seventeen occur after al-Awlaki’s death).  Unlike in the media data, the legality 
frame is used with greater frequency than the strategy frame, and the frequency of the morality 
frame is higher in the press releases than it is in the broadcast transcripts.  
Table 3: Frequency of Frames in ACLU and Amnesty International Press Releases 
Frame Advocacy Organization Press Releases (n=17) 
Strategy 4 (23.53%) 
Morality 9 (52.94%) 
Legality 17 (100%) 
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 By nature, advocacy organizations focus more attention on the prognostic components of 
framing than do the media.  The single most common argument made in advocacy organizational 
press releases is the legal-prognostic argument that the federal government should be more 
transparent about the details of the drone program, particularly those regarding the criteria that 
warrant authorization of the targeted killing of an individual, especially when that individual is a 
United States citizen.  Fourteen of the seventeen press releases made this argument.  At the time 
of al-Awlaki’s death in September 2011, the US government had yet to acknowledge the use of 
drones for targeted killing altogether, let alone provided a rationale for its use in particular cases.  
Interestingly, the prognostic framing of the drone issue by advocacy organizations does 
not call for the termination of the drone program; rather, it focuses on recommendations for 
responsible use of drones.  Transparency is the most common of these recommendations, but the 
argument that the government must create clear rules for oversight and coordination of the 
program is also prominent.  The ACLU repeatedly implores the federal court system to force the 
executive branch into making these changes.   
DISCUSSION 
Having established the introduction of the legality frame into the discourse regarding the 
use of drones and the targeted killing program, this paper suggests several potential implications 
of the generation of this new frame for American ideology within the post-9/11 context.  A 
significant literature attempts to describe and analyze framing behavior—that is, processes and 
techniques used by contentious political actors to mobilize support (Gamson 1992; Benford 
1993; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Byrd 2007; Reese 2010).  This paper addresses these 
same processes in the context of the US targeted killing program.  The purpose of this paper, 
however, is not only to examine descriptively the framing of targeted killings; it is to address the 
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other side of the framing coin—that is, the issue of frame resonance and reception.  Prior 
literature argues that frames gain resonance through cultural identification and that framing 
represents remedial ideological work for citizens who engage in reality construction to negotiate 
cultural contradictions (Zald 1996; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 2000).  Drawing 
from these theoretical perspectives and the empirical findings of this paper, it is possible to make 
inferences about social implications of a highly resonant “legality” frame. 
The findings of this paper suggest that prior to the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, 
consideration of targeted killings as a legal issue, at least in the major informational and activist 
channels of American society, was nonexistent.  The analysis revealed zero instances of concern 
over the legality of the targeted killing of Baitullah Mehsud in 2009 from the media, and the 
incident was not addressed through the press by major advocacy organizations.  At the time of 
Mehsud’s death, drones were understood only as strategic military devices being used to achieve 
success in a declared military conflict.  Nevertheless, the shift in the framing of drones reveals 
the symbolic quality of drones within the post-9/11 United States. 
Neither the Mehsud killing nor the al-Awlaki killing generated a conversation of guilt; 
that is, it was assumed in the media and advocacy rhetoric that Mehsud and al-Awlaki had in fact 
committed crimes worthy of being targeted and killed by the US government under the 
Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) that was passed after 9/11.  In fact, the al-
Awlaki aftermath featured a high frequency of rhetoric justifying the killing, yet it was at this 
point in the discourse that the legality frame emerged.  The combination of these discursive 
elements—the assumption of guilt and the simultaneous concerns over legality—indicates that 
activists’ use of the legality frame was spurred by abstract concerns over the theoretical 
implications of the killing rather than the particular material circumstances of the incident.  In the 
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comparative model, citizenship functioned as an independent variable; despite the widespread 
assumption that both Mehsud and al-Awlaki were guilty of crimes worthy of treatment as enemy 
combatants, it appears that al-Awlaki’s American citizenship—rather than al-Awlaki’s death as a 
unique incident—provided the fodder for the emergence of the legality frame.   
The emergence of the legality frame as a response to cultural concerns over the role of 
citizenship in the post-9/11 US political climate is consistent with Benford and Snow’s (2000) 
discussion of cultural resonance and Snow and Benford’s (2000) discussion of the relationship 
between framing and ideology.  The emergence and continued use of the legality frame likely 
infers that it struck and continues to act upon a salient cultural note.  The ambiguity of the United 
States’ enemies after 9/11 created a precarious situation that facilitated dangerous 
marginalization for segments of the US population, but the extent of these concerns rarely 
resulted in anything beyond profiling, from an institutional standpoint (Chandhoke 2007; 
Schildkraut 2009).  The targeted killing of al-Awlaki brought these previous concerns into sharp 
focus, potentially stripping to some extent the perceived protections of citizenship for groups or 
individuals the government viewed as suspicious or dangerous; this perception was exacerbated 
by the perceived lack of due process and unilateral decision making in the al-Awlaki case, 
creating a scenario in which Americans could not be completely certain that they were safe from 
their own government.   
The intense ideological contradiction produced by this set of circumstances forced 
individuals and institutions to engage in a process of reality construction—the outcome of which 
was the legality frame.  Al-Awlaki’s killing created the type of ideological contradiction that 
Zald (1996) argues necessitates reality construction; the development of a new frame provided 
the opportunity for Americans to adopt a new cognitive schema that allowed them to situate the 
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strike within previously existing ideological beliefs.  The “us versus them” rhetoric of the US 
government following 9/11 established Chandhoke’s (2007) notion of the war on terror 
ideology—that US foreign policy would be designed to achieve success in the war on terror.  
Simultaneously, the purpose of winning the war on terror was articulated as for the protection of 
civil liberties of American citizens.   These two related sets of beliefs—winning the war on terror 
and the preservation of civil liberties—existed as parallel and complementary ideologies in the 
years after 9/11.  As a result, targeted killings (among other national security issues) could be 
seen as being supportive of maintaining these two parallel sets of beliefs.   
 Al-Awlaki’s death brought these two previously parallel ideological beliefs into 
contradiction with one another.  By killing an American citizen in an act that was perceived by 
many to violate that citizen’s constitutional right to due process, the US government essentially 
violated one set of beliefs (maintenance of civil liberties) for the purpose of achieving the other 
(winning the war on terror).  As a result, American activists engaged in framing as remedial 
ideological work; that is, the legality frame was created to assist Americans in situating the 
killing of an American within a framework of previously held ideological beliefs that such an 
event would never occur (Snow and Benford 2000).  The establishment of targeted killings as a 
legal issue helped stabilize the ideological contradiction by portraying the agents that authorized 
the killing as deviant.  By conceptualizing the killing as illegal, activists framing the issue in this 
way made it possible for Americans to understand the event without having to rearrange deeply 
held ideological beliefs about the purpose of the war on terror.  Essentially, the killing could be 
reduced to a particular, deviant decision by individuals rather than a harbinger of a completely 
new ideological narrative.   
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 The fact that there was little, if any, dispute over al-Awlaki’s guilt in the aftermath of his 
death brings the significance of the legality frame into sharper focus.  That is, the incident most 
likely did not alter the degree of concern over being targeted by the state for the majority of 
Americans.  The implications are more abstract; the adoption of the legality frame into the 
discourse suggests that al-Awlaki’s death functioned as a pivot point in the narrative of the 
negotiation between security and liberty in the post-9/11 United States.  At a minimum, the 
incident prompted a moment of national collective self-reflection in the aftermath of a successful 
military endeavor. 
CONCLUSION 
 The analysis in this study revealed a distinct shift and elaboration of the discourse on 
drones and targeted killing as an attempt to negotiate the new realities of the program within 
deeply ingrained ideological beliefs about the post-9/11 political climate in the United States.  
The process of reframing an issue in order to repair breaches between empirical observations and 
ideological beliefs is one that has been thoroughly articulated in the literature (Zald 1996; Snow 
and Benford 2000).  Though this particular study provided strong evidence of the introduction of 
a new, legality frame into the public sphere discourse, these results must be seen as a starting 
point for future research that can help better clarify the role of a new relatively new form of 
technology that continues to gain prominence in a number of social arenas.   
 The primary shortcoming of a study such as this one is that it must be temporally 
bounded.  That is, as time goes on, the drone program continues to develop and more 
circumstances emerge that can impact the discourse.  This study, however, was strategically 
designed to capture the impact of a particular event—the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki—on the 
framing of the program.  Future research can address the continuous discourse on the US drone 
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program by conducting similar studies to this one that focus around other potential pivot points 
or key moments in the development of military drone use and targeted killing.  Additionally, 
establishing the relationship between public opinion and the way targeted killing is framed in the 
media would be beneficial in corroborating the impact of the framing of the issue in the 
American population.  The issues of frame resonance and reception must be a major element of 
research on framing moving forward. 
 The framing of targeted killings reveals changes in the presentation of the security versus 
liberty debate, but an additional major piece of this puzzle is drone surveillance.  The issue of 
surveillance has taken center stage in the drone discourse, and fears over domestic surveillance 
have become a major point of political contention in the United States.  By the very nature of 
surveillance, the discourse on this issue is likely to be highly based in legal concerns, but the idea 
of using surveillance to advance the US position in the war on terror remains a counterpoint.  
Future research should analyze discourse on drone surveillance to further clarify the arguments 
about the negotiation between security and liberty presented in this paper.  By examining this 
alternative use of drone technology, in combination with the findings about the framing of 
targeted killings, sociological researchers can paint a more complete picture of the symbolic role 
of drones in the American public sphere. 
 The proliferation of uses for drones appears, anecdotally, to be moving quickly.  Drone 
technology has been recently suggested for use in myriad roles including package delivery, 
border control, monitoring drug trafficking, meteorology purposes, and others.  It is essential for 
researchers to continue to monitor this trend as the introduction of drones into a variety of public 
and private arenas could have significant social and economic impacts ranging from the obvious 
political implications to new forms of industry and potential impacts on employment, among 
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others.  The drone issue is one that is relatively young, and researchers have an opportunity to 
build a rich, sociological understanding of the role this new technology plays in American 
society.  
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